Abstract. Authentication is a process by which one satis es another about one's claim of identity. Typically an authentication server provides the authentication service via an authentication protocol. The authentication service is a security bottleneck in that its compromise can lead to the compromise of the whole system. The service is also a performance bottleneck because many activities cannot proceed unless the identities of concerned parties can be satisfactorily established. Therefore, a desirable authentication service should be both highly secure and highly available. We propose a general solution by replicating the authentication server such that a minority of malicious and colluding servers cannot compromise security or disrupt service. We discuss some unusual features of such a distributed authentication service, including the trade-o between availability and security. A distributed service is also useful when clients cannot identify or agree upon trusted servers prior to authentication. For example, in some cooperative or federated systems, clients simply cannot all trust the same set of servers.
Introduction
Authentication is a process by which one satis es another about one's claim of identity. In mutual authentication, pairs of principals, e.g., clients or servers, satisfy themselves mutually about each other's identity. Typically an authentication server provides the authentication service via an authentication protocol. An authentication service is fundamental in maintaining security in a distributed system because identi cation underlines any and all enforcement of any security policy as well as administration activities such as accounting and audit. This service is therefore a security bottleneck; once it is compromised, no security can be guaranteed. In an open environment, an individual server may This paper appeared in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, Vol.11, No.5, June, 1993, pp.657-662. not be completely and permanently trustworthy. A benign server could fail or make mistakes; a compromised one could be malicious by leaking client keys or by deliberately sending bogus messages. Moreover, a centralized service could not support activities such as internal auditing, for no one would be in a position to guard the guards. The authentication service is naturally also a performance bottleneck because many activities cannot proceed unless the identities of those involved can be satisfactorily established. For example, authentication must be available whenever a user starts a new session, or executes a protocol such as rlogin, ftp, or telnet. The service is also used quite often by system utilities. One machine may need to connect to a network server to retrieve electronic mail messages every ve minutes throughout the day. A failure of the authentication server would be very disruptive.
A desirable authentication service therefore should be highly available and highly secure at the same time. There are a number of ways to increase the availability of the service. A common approach is to replicate the authentication server so that any one of several servers can perform authentication. However, this approach reduces the level of security in that if one server is compromised, security is compromised. Another way to increase availability is to reduce the dependency on the service. For example, a server could issue a certi cate which is valid for a period of time, during which there is no need to further contact the server. However, this scheme also degrades the level of security in that a certi cate is hard to revoke once issued. The longer a certi cate can remain valid, the better in terms of service availability, but the worse for security. As we will discuss later, replication is also useful in dealing with untrustworthy servers to increase the security of the authentication service. However, simple replications also suggest a trade-o between increasing availability and increasing security. In this paper, we propose a general solution by replicating the authentication server in such a way that multiple servers share the responsibility of providing the authentication service and a minority of compromised servers cannot compromise the service through malicious behavior and collusion. As a proof of concept, we use secret-sharing techniques and introduce a cross-checksum scheme to develop a protocol that is similar to the Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol Needham 78], but is di erent in that a set of servers provide a distributed authentication service, with each server providing only a fraction of the authentication. The protocol has the following properties: fewer than a threshold number of colluding servers cannot compromise security, e.g., by leaking information about the session keys; service is available if a threshold number of uncompromised servers are operational. Adjusting the thresholds can explore the trade-o between availability and security. We call such a protocol a distributed authentication protocol. Since clients do not share secrets before authentication completes, they cannot verify the correctness of the replicated service through a separate and secure channel. This unique feature distinguishes the replication of an authentication server from other replications such as a key-based secure replication of a le server Herlihy 87] . A distributed authentication service is particularly useful when clients cannot identify or agree upon trusted servers prior to authentication. Apart from enabling activities such as internal auditing, such a distributed service also forms a necessary basis for some cooperative or federated systems (e.g., Bull 92] ). For example, mutually competitive, hostile, but nevertheless communicating organizations cannot let any particular organization to manage the authentication service; nor can they all trust the same set of servers.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. We rst recall the concept of authentication and describe a typical, centralized, authentication protocol. We then examine the e ect of some simple replication schemes and demonstrate the trade-o between security and availability. After that, we propose a replication scheme and analyze its security properties. We estimate the cost incurred by this replication, as well as possible variations of the basic protocol, and discuss the use of public-key cryptosystem. We conclude with a summary and suggestions for future work.
Authentication
Authentication is by de nition a process to verify one's claim of identity. For brevity, we use mutual authentication in our discussion, though our results also apply to one way authentication. An authentication protocol can be based on either a conventional cryptosystem or a public-key system or both Di e 76, Needham 78] . We rst concentrate on the (most common) case of using conventional systems. Later we will discuss the use of public-key systems. Since authentication is usually a prelude to further communication and computation, an authentication protocol often arranges that the protocol participants, once their identities are veri ed, agree upon an encryption key{a session key{for later use (e.g., within a user session). Thus an authentication protocol is sometimes also called a key distribution protocol. Let us now examine a protocol that is similar to the Needham-Schroeder protocol Needham Normally the above protocol is implemented using only one server S. As we argued earlier, such a con guration naturally creates a performance bottleneck and a security bottleneck. For example, a malicious server could leak keys such as Ka, Kb, or Kab; it could also deliberately send a message that contains an unsafe (e.g., long compromised) session key Kab. Even a benign server could fail and cause similar problems by mistake. In other words, the implicit assumption that S is a fail-stop processor 1 is too optimistic because several more issues must also be taken into account:
Information leakage: a server may leak, by accident or deliberately, information about a key. Cheating: a server may impersonate a client or mislead a client to use an unsafe key. Failure: the service may be unavailable, because a server crashes or sends faulty messages, or because the communication mechanism fails. Denial of service: a server may intentionally refuse to respond to requests. Therefore, it is desirable to increase the availability and the security of the authentication service, by distributing the responsibility of providing the service among many servers. Let us examine a few simple replication schemes to increase availability or security. Suppose we replicate an arbitrary number of servers and any one of them can play the role of S in the above protocol. Now the service's availability can be arbitrarily high. However, any server would have to know all the client keys, thus can leak these and the session keys it sets up. It can also impersonate clients using their keys. Therefore, security of the service relies on the proper behavior of all the servers, and more servers need adequate (physical and other forms of) protection. In short, the higher the availability, the weaker the security. In a di erent arrangement, suppose we replicate an arbitrary number of servers but, instead of allowing any server to act as S, we require each server to generate a key Kab. Clients A and B use the exclusive-or of all these keys as the nal session key. We could also require that a client registers di erent secret keys with di erent servers. Now the service's security can be arbitrarily high because as long as one server is not compromised, impersonation cannot happen, and a client will not be cheated into accepting a compromised session key. However, if only one server refuses to cooperate, authentication cannot be completed. Thus, the availability depends on the proper behavior of all the servers. In short, the stronger the security, the lower the availability. We can imagine many schemes between the two extremes of the spectrum just described, which suggest a trade-o between availability and security. We propose a distributed authentication protocol with the following property that fewer than a threshold number of colluding servers cannot cause security breach and authentication is available if at least a threshold number of uncompromised servers are operational. The trade-o between availability and security can be explored by adjusting the thresholds. From now on, we do not distinguish between denial of service, node crash, 1 A fail-stop processor automatically halts in response to any internal failure and does so before the e ects are visible to the outside world Schlichting 83] . and communication failure, because they are all availability issues and have the same appearance to clients. Also, because bogus messages and faulty messages are not always distinguishable, we refer to them simply as illegitimate messages.
Distributed Authentication
Suppose n servers, S 1 ; : : :; S n , collectively provide an authentication service. We assume that a client (say A) registers a di erent key Kai with server S i . Client A can derive these keys from a master key Ka. For example, if h() is a suitable one-way hash function Di e 76, Merkle 90], then A could register key Kai = h(Ka; S i ) with server S i . This arrangement gives extra security since one server (say S 1 ) does not know A's other keys (Ka; Ka2; : : :; Kan).
To prevent information leakage, a session key must not be generated by or known to a single server. In fact, there is a major di culty in letting servers involved in choosing the key. Because A and B do not have a secure communication channel for veri cation purposes before authentication completes, clients cannot easily reach an agreement on what they have received from which servers. Therefore, we let both clients participate in choosing a session key; one may not trust the other's competency in this aspect. Although must be capable of generating good random numbers, a client concerned about key quality can require a few candidate keys generated by the servers or other sources and select one or exclusive-or some of them. The exclusive-or of all candidate keys will be a good key as long as at least one candidate key is good (presumably chosen by a uncorrupted server) even if some candidate keys are suspect. A preliminary version of the new protocol is as follows.
A Preliminary Distributed Mutual Authentication Protocol. Each participant generates a nonce (nsi for S i , na for A, and nb for B), which is later included in encrypted messages (3 though 7) addressed to the participant so that the freshness of the messages can be established Needham 87] . With messages 1 and 2, A obtains a nonce from each server. A chooses a candidate session key x and computes f t;n (x; i) for each server S i . Here f t;n () is a threshold function Kothari 84] that produces n shadows of x in such a way that it is easy to recover x from any t shadows, but less than t shadows reveals no information about x. We will explain this function later. In message 3, A sends one shadow to each server. In fact, A sends to B the shadows which are later forwarded to the servers. Similarly, in message 4, B selects y, computes the f t;n (y; i)'s, and sends one shadow to each server. In messages 5 and 6, S i essentially acts as a broker for A and B to exchange shadows x i and y i . After messages 5 and 6, B computes x from the x i 's and A computes y from the y i 's. Then they both compute session key Kab = g(x; y), where g() is a pre-determined one-way hash function, and complete a two way handshake. To see how f t;n () works, we describe Shamir's secret-sharing scheme Shamir 79], which is based on polynomial interpolation. To compute f t;n (x; i), A chooses a random (t ? 1) degree polynomial p(x) with p(0) = x. A then computes x i = f t;n (x; i) = p(i); i = 1; : : :; n. Due to the property of interpolation, given any t of the x i 's, B can easily determine p() and recover x = p(0). With less than t shadows, no information about x can be determined. The time complexity to compute n shadows is O(nt). The time complexity to recover x is O(t log 2 t). Using such a threshold scheme e ectively prevents fewer than t compromised and colluding servers from leaking information about the session key, because they cannot gather enough shadows to recover x or y. In fact, they have absolutely no information about Kab. The use of g() ensures that as long as one of x and y is carefully chosen (e.g., random, never used before), Kab is likely to be a good key. More subtly, g() prevents A or B from forcing a session key. A and B cannot detect illegitimate messages, however. For instance, suppose n = (2t ? 1), then (t ? 1) colluding servers cannot learn any information about x or y. Nevertheless, when (t ? 1) servers send bogus shadows or faulty messages, every set of t shadows B (or A) receives may recover a di erent x (or y) value. In this case, A (or B) has no way to verify the legitimacy of the shadows, i.e., to determine whether the shadows received are indeed what B (or A) sent. Again this is because that before authentication completes, A and B do not have a separate secure channel to verify the legitimacy of the shadows. In fact, they may never have such a channel if the service is bogus. In theory, A and B could try handshakes with all possible session keys derived from all combinations of the shadows until a dialogue is successful. This may not be secure in that a wrong combination may result in a cryptographically weak key that could be explored by malicious servers. Also this may not be practical if the number of combinations is large. Moreover, it is more economical if A and B can determine Kab without exchanging many messages. Therefore, for veri cation purposes, more redundancy of the shadows must be provided together with the shadows themselves. Shadows give A (or B) enough information to retrieve y (or x). Extra redundancy of the shadows tells A (or B) how to retrieve y (or x). This is in fact an authentication of the servers' behaviors, which would be impossible in a centralized approach.
The requirement of the additional redundancy is closely related to the concept of veri able secret sharing, which is a scheme for some parties to securely share a secret by keeping di erent shadows, yet it is possible to verify that a shadow is legitimate. Some proposed schemes (e.g., Chor 85]) are not very suited to the application here because they use many rounds of messages and usually require all participants' cooperation to complete the protocol. We now introduce a cross-checksum scheme as a suitable alternative. Informally, a cross-checksum scheme supplies checksums together with messages in a manner that it is possible to verify the authenticity of the messages by cross checking the checksums. We de ne cross checksums for x and y as cc(x) = (g(x 1 ); : : :; g(x n )) and cc(y) = (g(y 1 ); : : :; g(y n )), respectively, where g() is a one-way hash function. By replacing x i and y i with (x i ; cc(x)) and (y i ; cc(y)) respectively in the preliminary version of the protocol, we obtain:
A Distributed Mutual Authentication Protocol. Adding the cross checksums does not degrade security because g() is a one-way hash function (e.g., Merkle 90]). We require that given a number of pairs z's and g(z)'s, it is computationally infeasible to compute k from g(k; x) and x. Moreover, because of the birthday paradox, if g() is used in a su ciently large amount of messages, malicious servers would be able to nd x i 's that match the cross checksum cc(x) by looking up a dictionary of past messages. To defeat this birthday attack, the life time of g() must be limited according to the properties of the particular function. Requirement for h() is similar. In fact, h() and g() can be the same function.
Since a legitimate message contains legitimate shadows and legitimate cross checksums, and a good (i.e., uncomprised and not faulty) server sends only legitimate messages, A and B can e ciently identify legitimate shadows, provided that more than half of the messages received are legitimate.
The algorithm is de ned as follows. For every g(x j ) in cross checksum cc(x) received from S i , if x j is also received from S j , B recomputes g(x j ) from x j and compares it with the received g(x j ). If the two are identical, x j is given one credit point, or rather, S i gives S j one point. After all such checks are done, legitimate shadows are those from the servers which have the highest credit points, if more than half of the servers are good. To prove this algorithm correct, observe that server S j gets a credit point from a good server S i if and only if S j 's shadow is legitimate. Since good servers give credits to good servers and they outnumber the bad ones, servers which send legitimate messages will receive more credit points. This algorithm computes O(n 2 ) one-way hash functions and comparisons.
In the protocol, after message 5 (or 6), B (or A) rst identi es the legitimate shadows with which to recover x (or y), and then computes g(x; y) to obtain the session key. B (or A) considers the service unavailable if x (or y) cannot be recovered, i.e., when less than t servers get more than t credit points. Let uc; fs; nfs; c denote, respectively, the numbers of servers that are uncomprised and operational, failed and fail-stop, failed but not fail-stop, and compromised. Then uc+fs+nfs+c = n. The above proof shows that the service is available if uc > max(t ? 1; nfs + c), where typically t could be set to t = nfs + c + 1. When shadows and checksums in faulty messages can be assumed to be random and unknown to the colluding servers, these messages are unlikely to increase the credit points of servers which send illegitimate messages. In this case, the service is available if uc > max(t ? 1; c). When c < t, malicious servers may cause denial of service but cannot compromise security. When a small number of servers are compromised, A and B may detect message losses or illegitimate messages. They could report such observations to the appropriate authorities so that suitable actions, such as inspecting suspect sites, repairing failed servers, and cleaning up compromised ones, can be taken. A client may need to change password when the accumulated total number of compromised servers since last password change is close of the threshold t. If the service is unavailable, A and B may have to try again.
Discussion
Distributing authentication among multiple servers is costly. A cross checksum signi cantly increases the length of a message. Since there are n servers to communicate with 2 , the total number of messages is 4n + 3. If participants of the protocol already have synchronized clocks, they can use time-stamps in place of the nonces to prove message timeliness Denning 81]. In this case, A no longer needs the initial exchange (messages 1 and 2), thus the total number of messages is reduced from 4n + 3 to 2n + 3. Maintaining synchronized clocks by itself is a non-trivial and costly task (e.g., Mills 89, Simons 90, Liskov 91, Gong 92]). Also, since the clock of a compromised or faulty server cannot be trusted to tell the correct time, a client may need to vote on the time-stamps received from the servers. Note that a compromised server may try to synchronize to a faulty clock to maximize the chance of a successful attack.
Letting Kab = g(x; y) has an interesting e ect in that if A uses an incorrect value of y to compute Kab, such a key would in the worst case be useless to A. It cannot be compromised as long as A has carefully chosen a good value of x. Similar arguments apply to B. This means that the servers do not have to be concerned, for security reasons, about the freshness of messages 3 and 4. At most messages 5 and 6 will be wasted. Thus at the expense of possible waste of resources, messages 1 and 2 can be safely removed without assuming synchronized clocks, and the total number of messages can be again reduced from 4n + 3 to 2n + 3.
In the proposed protocol, both A and B contribute to choosing Kab. If this can be relaxed so that one participant decides on the session key, the total number of messages can be further reduced, with the use of time-stamps, to 2n. This is the minimum because each operational server at least receives a message and sends a message. Some servers may deserve more trust based on a security policy or the history of performance and 2 This is a worst-case analysis; it is not mandatory that a client communicates with all servers, since enough legitimate messages could possibly be obtained from a smaller number of servers. reliability. Hierarchical threshold schemes Kothari 84] can be used in this case. One scheme is to give selected servers more shadows so that they have more say in voting out illegitimate messages and they contribute more to availability. This weighted voting approach works well because the security parameters (the weights) can be dynamically assigned and a protocol operates consistently in the presence of network partitions Gi ord 79]. Moreover, by assigning more votes to some servers, clients may communicate with less servers, thus the number of messages is reduced and the overall availability is improved. This once again demonstrates the trade-o between availability and security. Servers need not communicate among themselves. Any requirement of coordination among the servers for completing the protocol would unnecessarily complicate the situation because more messages would be needed and disruptive behavior of compromised servers must be handled properly. The proposed solution by no means implies that the servers can be placed without adequate protection. Only that the compromise or failure of one server is much less of a threat. Consequently, an authentication server need not necessarily run on a dedicated machine and a replicated approach may not require additional hardware. There are a number of ways to manage the database, e.g., the /etc/passwd le in the Unix system, which stores user information including passwords. A server could be regarded as an autonomous entity and a user registers and changes keys with each server separately. An alternative is to have a trusted master server to maintain a master key database. This server handles initial user registration and password change. Periodically it computes from a user's master password his passwords for di erent servers, creates a subsidiary database for each server, and feeds it to the appropriate server. This master server need not be on-line or available at all times, thus does not in general create a performance bottleneck. It need not be a security bottleneck either in that it may discard the master passwords once the subsidiary databases are installed. In this case, a user could set up a secure channel with the master server by using the distributed authentication service. Sometimes, some participants of the protocol are capable of remembering long secrets and have the computational capability to use public-key cryptosystems. One such case is when A is a user equipped with a smart-card and B is a le server. In such cases, the distributed authentication service can take advantage of the special features of public-key cryptosystem to improve the e ciency of the authentication protocol.
Suppose that A and B have public keys K pa and K pb respectively, and they keep the corresponding private keys secret. Also assume that they still share conventional system keys with the servers. Now an authentication protocol could arrange that A obtains K pb (instead of y) and B obtains K pa (instead of x) Needham 78] , similarly using the servers as brokers. Since K pa (or K pb ) need not be kept secret, the only requirement is that B (or A) should not, perhaps as a result of cheating on the part of some servers, associate a di erent public key with A (or B). Thus we no longer need the secret-sharing scheme, nor the cross-checksum scheme, and the protocol can be simpli ed by replacing (x i ; cc(x)) with K pa , and (y i ; cc(y)) with K pb in the messages. After receiving messages from the servers, A (or B) performs a (possibly weighted) voting on B's (or A's) public keys received. If no majority is found, A (or B) considers the service unavailable. Otherwise, they can use the two keys directly for subsequent communication, or they can arrange a further session key (for a conventional cryptosystem) Needham 78] . The handshake messages need to be modi ed accordingly. When a client shares public keys with the servers, the case is similar except that the client has to remember many public keys. This last requirement could be relaxed by using a threshold signature scheme Desmedt 91, Reiter 92] . Other hybrid schemes are also possible. Most previous discussion on the trade-o between availability and security and on reducing the number of messages still apply.
Summary and Future Work
The authentication service is both a security bottleneck and a performance bottleneck, thus a desirable service should be both highly secure and highly available. There is strong evidence of a trade-o between increasing security and increasing availability. We have proposed a general solution by replicating the authentication server such that a minority of compromised servers cannot compromise the service through malicious behavior and collusion. As a proof of concept, we have described a distributed mutual authentication protocol (and its variations for improved e ciency) with this property, where the trade-o between security and availability can be adjusted. Apart from removing the bottlenecks, a distributed service is also useful when clients cannot identify trusted authentication servers or cannot all trust the same servers. A worthwhile e ort, like that in the Kerberos work Miller 88], would be to engineer a practical design of a distributed authentication service and complete an implementation. Issues such as inter-realm authentication Gligor 92] can only be fully examined in such an experiment. Also, the basic protocol may be extended to deal with additional concerns, such as protecting poorlychosen client keys Gong 93] . Reducing the cost of replication is important, especially when the use of public-key system is impractical. For example, using Rabin's secret-sharing scheme Rabin 89] can signi cantly reduce the size of a shadow, with only minor security implications in that t ? 1 shadows reveal limited information about a key. Better coding techniques may reduce the size of a cross checksum. We have not fully analyzed the proposed protocol using logics of authentication Burrows 90, Gong 90] , although preliminary examination suggests that the protocol does not have the kind of weaknesses that the logic is designed to capture.
